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FOREWORD
Sanctuary is a concept not encompassed in military
doctrine or government policy, yet denying sanctuary has become the cornerstone of American counterterrorism efforts abroad and a pillar of U.S. defense
strategy. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Guido’s probing
inquiry, exhaustive research, and innovative analysis
on terrorist sanctuary in the Saharan Desert provides
critical insights into this understudied idea underpinning so much contemporary defense policy.
History demonstrates the U.S. Army is no stranger
to denying sanctuary. The recent surrender of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, ending a
conflict lasting more than 50 years, reveals that terrorists and criminals using sanctuary can be defeated.
Unfortunately, U.S. efforts to deny terrorist sanctuary in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya
have fallen short. Through a detailed case study of a
group of al-Qaeda terrorists who found sanctuary in
the Saharan deserts of Northern Mali, Lieutenant Colonel Guido develops a schema to better understand
sanctuary, as well as the ways and means to control
and ultimately defeat terrorists who use sanctuary for
protection.
Lieutenant Colonel Guido’s contribution helps
commanders, staffs, strategic thinkers, and policymakers understand and attack sanctuary. This monograph
provides insight into the operational details, as well as
the logic of sanctuary-seeking terrorists, which could
be used to inform war games and staff exercises. Strategic thinkers and policymakers, on the other hand, will
find much to review here regarding the objectives for
future counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies and policies. Whether a practitioner or thinker,
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Lieutenant Colonel Guido’s study is a needed addition
to the contemporary literature on terrorism and insurgency, and his work is long overdue after 15 years of
war focused on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations—much of the brunt of which the U.S.
Army has borne.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Denying terrorists sanctuary has become a pillar
of U.S. defense strategy since the September 11, 2001
(9/11) attacks. Violent extremist organizations in
North Africa, such as the group al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), have used remote and sparsely
populated areas in the Sahara for protection from
security forces to conduct a range of terrorist activities,
such as training, planning, and logistics.1 Despite the
time elapsed since the 9/11 attacks, and the resources
dedicated to denying sanctuary globally, the concept
of sanctuary remains largely unexplored and poorly
understood. This monograph proposes a functional
understanding of sanctuary and offers fresh ideas to
deny it using a detailed case study of the most notorious of these North African terrorists, Mokhtar
Belmokhtar, from his arrival in Mali in the late 1990s,
until the French intervention in early 2013. This interdisciplinary inquiry uses a wide range of open-source
documents, as well as anthropological, sociological,
and political science research, including interviews
with a former Belmokhtar hostage, Ambassador Robert
Fowler, to construct a picture of what a day in the life
of a Saharan sanctuary-seeking terrorist is like in order
to provide further insight into terrorist sanctuary and
explore ways and means to deny or control it.
There are various actors involved in sanctuary, and
understanding those actors and their relationships is
central to a developing a method to deny sanctuary.
There are those who own the space, sanctuary providers or owners, and those who seek to gain from providing the space, rent-seekers or landlords. The owners
who control the space may not necessarily be the same
as the landlords who are seeking rents to administer
the space. The owners of the sanctuary in the region
ix

being examined are the pastoral families who live in
these areas. Rent-seekers, or landlords, whether chiefs,
criminal kingpins, or political appointees from the government, are often imposed upon the owners. Finally,
sanctuary-seekers require the space and are usually
those paying for using it. While those using sanctuary may not necessarily be the same as those who are
paying, evidence indicates Belmokhtar funded his
sanctuary—a tenant who paid his own bills.
Geography and people matter. Terrorists, criminals, and insurgents use remote places in the Sahara
because it offers protection. The operational effects
of the size, scale, and diversity of Saharan geography
cannot be overstated. Military operations across this
vast expanse realize many elements of the failed Desert
One rescue attempt in Iran: sandstorms, temperature,
distance, communication, security, and interaction
with local population. While the geography of this
region is imposing, people matter more. Those in the
Sahara live a difficult life but have a very keen sense of
history, understanding of the terrain, and pride in their
identity. Importantly, Saharan society is not inherently
compatible with Wahhabism, Salafism, and fundamentalist Islam. Quite the opposite: the complex social
structure specifically adapted to the difficult environmental and political conditions of desert life would
be heretical to orthodox Islam. The variance and high
degree of adaptability or flexibility in kinship relations
means tribal politics are complex and dynamic.
It is often assumed that sanctuary is cost-free: lack
of central authority or poor governance is interpreted
to mean terrorists can move in and establish their
operations. These Saharan sanctuary areas have existing social structures, however, and local populations
with needs seek to impose costs on sanctuary-seekers.
These costs, called rent, could be expressed through
x

cash transactions, through payment in providing services, goods exchange, or even political capital. Marriage and other social contracts could constitute a form
of payment through alliance-building.
Actions since the 9/11 attacks indicate the U.S.
response to sanctuary is to concentrate operations
against sanctuary-seekers. In other words, the focus
has been upon finding and destroying enemy forces:
Operation NEPTUNE SPEAR—the raid on the Osama
bin Laden compound in Pakistan—is the most famous
example. The present analysis suggests an alternative
approach may be worth considering, an approach that
focuses on the costs of creating and maintaining the
sanctuary which terrorists require for protection. One
solution to terrorist sanctuary may be to increase the
costs of sanctuary to the sanctuary-seeker or to change
the relationship of sanctuary supply and demand to a
point where the costs of sanctuary to the terrorist are
unsustainable or unacceptably high. In three words:
raise the rent.
ENDNOTES- SUMMARY
1. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is an Islamist
militant organization founded in Algeria with the objective to
overthrow the Algerian government and institute an Islamic state.
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TERRORIST SANCTUARY IN THE SAHARA:
A CASE STUDY
Sanctuary as a military idea is undefined and
remains poorly understood. Yet, denial of sanctuary
has become a mainstay of defense strategy: The 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) described “the new
strategic environment.”1 This QDR outlined a course
for the United States to become proactive in addressing security threats in order to prevent fragile states
from becoming failed states, as well as change the
conditions in fragile states that help terrorists conduct
operations. These objectives led to the development of
the QDR Execution Roadmap2 to “reduce the drivers of
instability, prevent terrorist attacks, or disrupt their
networks” as well as “deny sanctuary to terrorists” and
“separate terrorists from host populations.”3 A decade
later, the imperative to “deny sanctuary to terrorists”
remains, but the questions “What is sanctuary?” “Who
seeks sanctuary?” and “How can we deny sanctuary
to terrorists?” heretofore remain not only unanswered,
but also unasked.
Sanctuary is defense through other means. The
aim of sanctuary is protection, and sanctuary is not
an operation but a place, sometimes a series of places,
sometimes cognitive or virtual places: sanctuary is
space. People inhabit physical spaces and access to
these places requires one to deal with the inhabitants.
Such actions can be social in nature, resulting from the
interaction, and often manipulation, of local power
structures and fluid alliances. Physical sanctuary is
transactional in nature—everything is negotiable and
money talks. However, interacting and manipulating
local power structures requires understanding. Military intelligence is necessary for locating the enemy,
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but deep cultural and social knowledge is critical to
interacting and working successfully with the groups
who own the sanctuary where the enemy resides.
This monograph finds inspiration in Roger Trinquier’s dictum, “To carry out a war effectively, to win it,
it is indispensable to identify the adversary exactly.”4
This monograph focuses on a specific segment of the
al-Qaeda affiliates operating in Northern Mali until
2013, concentrating on the activities of an Algerian
named Mokhtar Belmokhtar—an experienced jihadist
who came of age fighting the Soviet Army in Afghanistan and working with Osama bin Laden.5 Belmokhtar
has many noms de guerre: “one-eyed” after losing an
eye to shrapnel; “Mr. Marlboro” from his regional cigarette-smuggling cartel; even “the Uncatchable” by
French intelligence because of his ability to escape capture—he has escaped capture and been reported dead
at least half a dozen times.6 Belmokhtar is of particular
interest because of his many previous successful operations, notably the capture of Canadian diplomats, as
well as a large-scale attack on an Algerian oil facility.7
Finally, Belmokhtar is a good case because his prolific
activities have left a trail for us to follow—important
when examining the underbelly of shadowy, criminal
organizations.
A variety of sources indicate Belmokhtar used the
area around the city of Aguelhok in Northern Mali for
sanctuary until the arrival of French military forces
in 2013.8 Notably, Aguelhok was the first city seized
by al-Qaeda in the Islam Maghreb (AQIM) and other
groups in January 2012 using “Al-Qaeda-style tactics.”9 Aguelhok is significant because not only was
it the opening battle between Belmokhtar and Malian
government forces, but also because its geography,
history, and local politics made it an ideal sanctuary
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for Belmokhtar’s group. Additionally, Aguelhok has
struck an artistic chord: this tiny Saharan city was the
dramatic spark for the film Timbuktu that the director
noted “a 2012 incident in which militants in Aguelhok
in northern Mali stoned to death an unmarried couple
who had two children” inspired him to make a movie
set in the much more famous city Timbuktu.10
Mokhtar Belmokhtar needed sanctuary for specific
operational requirements: protection from hot pursuit
and refuge from intelligence services, logistics, planning, and training. Belmokhtar only had sanctuary,
however, because his income generating activities
provided capital to pay for it. Illicit activities, such
as cocaine smuggling and hostage taking, funded his
extremist operations, as well as expanding and reinforcing his base of local support. Thus, income generation and public affairs that constitute more than
half, and perhaps almost all his allocation, of available
resources are not functions sanctuary serves terrorists, but necessary activities to maintain the sanctuary.
Furthermore, the kinds of illicit activities Belmokhtar
engaged in are not constrained by social norms or local
conventions, because these extremists feel justified in
using any available means to further their ends including unacceptable or forbidden activities. Finally, the
markets for these illicit income generating activities
are far away and generally in regions targeted by the
extremists, principally Europe.
Sanctuary and operational capacity are not equivalent. Belmokhtar required sanctuary space but needed
the means to pay for it. The functions which sanctuary
served him as a terrorist did not include his fundraising activities, even though those activities enabled the
sanctuary. Interdicting Belmokhtar’s logistics could
neutralize his operational capability, but not neutralize
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his organization. Denying Belmokhtar sanctuary
would neutralize his operational capability, as well as
deny his ability to reconstitute that logistical system—
at least at that location. However, an alternative
objective could seek to control the underlying mechanisms that allow sanctuary—specifically Belmokhtar’s
alliances with sanctuary-owners and rent-seekers.
Increasing sanctuary rent provides alternatives other
than destruction of enemy forces, such as decreasing
resources for terrorist operations, coercing the group
to move into a lower rent sanctuary area, bankrupting the group, transforming the terrorist group into a
criminal enterprise, or fusing with the local society and
becoming part of the local social landscape. Viewing
sanctuary as a system of rents between sanctuary-space
owner and sanctuary-seeker provides an innovative
schema to understand, control, and deny sanctuary to
terrorists.
ON SANCTUARY
Sanctuarium, a Latin word for containers that protect holy objects or holy people, connotes spirituality
and implies a degree of divine sanction. While this
monograph focuses upon sanctuary, other popular
terms such as safe haven and refuge all illustrate a relationship between a place and safety.
The 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism made denying sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists a “second front” in the Global War
on Terror.11 The September 11, 2001 9/11 Commission
Report published in July 2004 paid particular attention
to terrorist sanctuary and the methods to deny it.12 A
Congressional Research Service study noted, “U.S.
efforts to deny terrorists sanctuary were substantially
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increased worldwide” after the 9/11 attacks.13 In turn,
Congress has held numerous hearings to identify policies and methods for denying sanctuary, but in 2008,
the Government Accountability Office concluded the
United States lacked a comprehensive plan to destroy
the terrorist sanctuary in Pakistan.14 What sanctuary
is, and the specific functions it performs, however,
remained unspecified.
Sanctuary and the U.S. Army Experience
The U.S. Army has a longstanding, if often overlooked, relationship with sanctuary. The Continental
Army under General George Washington effectively
used sanctuary in areas like Valley Forge for protection from the British Army during the Revolutionary
War. Washington selected Valley Forge because it was
close enough to the British to keep their raiding and
foraging parties out of the interior of Pennsylvania, yet
far enough away to prevent British surprise attacks.
This sanctuary area was easily defensible because of
its densely forested plateau that provided firewood
and timber to construct the thousands of log huts used
for shelter. Politically relevant yet militarily secure, the
Valley Forge encampment was the sanctuary the Continental Army needed to survive and prepare for the
next campaign.
Later, the U.S. Army pursued Poncho Villa into his
sanctuary areas in Northern Mexico; the Philippine
Constabulary sought to pacify the Moros in mountain
sanctuary areas; and the Cuban Constabulary attacked
sanctuary areas of indigenous insurgents in various
small wars at the turn of the century.15 Throughout
the Indian Wars, the U.S. Army pursued small bands
of highly mobile Indian fighters, such as those under
Geronimo, who used large expanses of the American
5

West as sanctuary. Geronimo and his band of 38 men,
women, and children evaded capture from thousands
of Mexican and American soldiers in a form of mobile
sanctuary. This small band was highly mobile, foraged
for provisions, and possessed an intimate knowledge
of the terrain across Northern Mexico, Arizona, and
New Mexico. Local populations were sympathetic to
the cause of Geronimo and provided support in the
form of horses and supplies, while some items, particularly weapons, were captured from U.S. or Mexican
forces.16
The U.S. Army adopted a sanctuary denial strategy of exhaustion against Geronimo. John Bigelow,
an Indian war veteran, and later a tactics instructor at
West Point, explained:
What decides the campaign [against the Indians] is not so
much physical exhaustion from long marches or scanty
nourishment as their mental weariness from constant
watching and devising and planning and their final
despair of ever thoroughly resting or returning to wives,
children, and sweethearts, unless it be as prisoners.17

General Nelson A. Miles, commander of the campaign to find Geronimo, summarized that U.S. forces
would “find, follow, and defeat” the enemy wherever they would go.18 Small units also adapted their
tactics to the nature of the fight. Logistics were highly
streamlined to give cavalry squadrons and mounted
infantry increased mobility and speed. The wagon
was abandoned in favor of the pack mule that did not
require repairs and could traverse very difficult terrain. Soldiers adopted the lifestyle of Indian fighters,
performing armed reconnaissance patrols over great
distances lasting weeks, sometimes months, carrying
fewer supplies, and having the ability to live off the
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land. Units could be resupplied through a “hub-andspoke” system from fixed bases or forts, but could also
self-sustain, procure provisions locally, or forage to
gain greater operational flexibility.
Command and control was highly decentralized
and tactical decisions were made by commanders on
the ground—often captains and lieutenants. Intelligence—an essential element of the campaign—was
provided through local agents such as the “Kit Carson
Scouts” who spoke local languages, understood local
customs, and could maintain the operational tempo
while coping with the hardships and dangers of frontier combat. Many of these scouts were former Indian
fighters that the Army employed in tasks such as questioning the local population, man-tracking, and even
as emissaries.19
U.S. Army operations to deny Geronimo sanctuary
were successful because of a combination of factors
including: tactical innovations like the use of mules,
decentralization of command, speed or the pace of
“find, follow, and defeat,” and removing material and
moral support to Geronimo by resettling local populations. Denying water resupply by guarding watering
holes also had a critical effect.20 Finally, the knowledge
of terrain and local populations possessed by U.S. leaders should not be overlooked. For example, Geronimo
surrendered to First Lieutenant Charles B. Gatewood
who spoke Apache and honored Apache traditions
and values.21
Geronimo’s sanctuary provides several insights.
First, the small scale of his force, a band of 38 people,
indicates possible diminishing returns to scale for sanctuary-seekers. Larger groups may have greater combat
power and can disperse across a greater range of space,
but they also require more support and are more
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difficult to control. Smaller groups are more cohesive,
more mobile, and easier to hide. In sanctuary, size matters. Second, Geronimo initially used national boundaries to facilitate sanctuary—he would seek refuge
from Mexican forces across the American border, and
vice-versa. However, this was no longer effective once
U.S. and Mexican military forces combined to search
for Geronimo. This indicates an important concept for
sanctuary—mobile sanctuary—where sanctuary-seekers find sanctuary not in one place, but many different
places across a wide region. Denying mobile sanctuary,
as the American experience in the Southwest indicates,
is exceptionally difficult, and, therefore, can be an
excellent form of sanctuary. Finally, if one is to believe
the American accounts, the U.S. Army did not physically break Geronimo’s group or defeat it in combat,
but broke their will and induced mental weariness,
which alludes to another important form of sanctuary:
cognitive sanctuary.
Sanctuary in the 20th Century
Sanctuary in the 20th century has denoted guerilla
rear areas, such as the countryside base areas of Mao
in China. The 20th-century understanding, therefore,
is closely aligned with the history of insurgencies and
counterinsurgency campaigns. Sanctuary, as a term
denoting rural refuge, was applied later to other peasant-oriented, revolutionary, communist movements
as in Cuba and Vietnam,22 yet Mao referred to these
zones not as sanctuary, but as “bases.”23 Mao’s key
element remained not locations, however, but popular support, which was later echoed by the Vietnamese
General Vo Nguyen Giap, who employed the concepts
articulated in Inside the Viet Minh against U.S. forces in
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South Vietnam.24 The essential ingredient for success
for these 20th-century social struggles, usually against
a formidable state military, was local support regardless if their protective areas were called bases, sanctuaries, or safe havens.
Mao and the Chinese Communists escaped Chinese Nationalist forces in The Long March. Mao
demonstrated a profound understanding of scale in
choosing his sanctuary areas, since he knew exactly
how far away to provide protection from the Chinese
Nationalists, yet remain close enough to the Chinese
population and Nationalist forces to be politically relevant and militarily effective. Mao’s political competitor, Zhang, on the other hand, proved true the maxim,
“isolation, military and political, is the great enemy of
guerrilla movements,”25 by conducting a retreat into
the far and remote Northwest of China to the isolated
high plateau of Qinghai and southern Ningxia. Zhang
and his group were politically and militarily isolated
and eventually became subsumed by the Soviet Union.
Mao’s retreat to the near Northwest of China, on the
other hand, was far enough from the reaches of the
Japanese and the Chinese Nationalists to remain viable
but close enough to remain relevant.26
Mao settled on sanctuary areas along common
boundaries of two or more provinces in order to “minimize the danger of attacks from provincial warlords or
governors.”27 This positioned Mao in zones of weakest
control by the local powerbrokers. Military parlance
calls these seams boundaries that delineate the span
of control from one organization to another. Interestingly, these boundaries often are located on important
terrain features like ridgelines, roads, or rivers to aid
in demarcating the precise location of the boundary to
everyday people and often facilitates movement from
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one area to another. Such boundaries often are more
social than geographic, and social boundaries are particularly relevant regarding groups in Northern Mali
when extended to ethnic and tribal identities, because
communities are “ambiguous, anomalous, marginal
societies that nestle in the interstices between normal
societies and ethnicities.”28
The U.S. Army experienced sanctuary in Vietnam
where fighters had a variety sanctuaries ranging from
sympathetic villages in South Vietnam, the internationally recognized territory of North Vietnam, and
the remote border areas in Laos and Cambodia. This
configuration of sanctuary areas—akin to Mao’s concept of base areas (North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) and guerrilla areas (communist controlled or
sympathetic areas in South Vietnam) made it difficult
for U.S. forces either to encircle or isolate the enemy.
One example that posed particular tactical difficulties
for American forces were the tunnel systems the North
Vietnamese Army constructed, which afforded protection and blurred the distinction between sanctuary and
fortification. These tunnel systems combined fortified
defenses in sanctuary areas, such as the tunnels of Cu
Chi.29 Fortifying sanctuary areas is common, such as
the caves and tunnels in the Tora Bora in Afghanistan,
but defensive fortifications and fixed structures are not
sanctuary per se.
Sanctuary, Islam, and Africa
The Islamic world in Africa has a rich history of
sanctuary as well. The Mahdi revolt, or Madhya, of
Sudan in the 19th century was a violent movement led
by the mystical Sufi known as the Mahdi. The Madhi
revolt rapidly gained in popularity and defeated British
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forces in 1885. The ability of the Mahdi army to move
rapidly in the vast and harsh expanse of the Sudanese
desert and the fanaticism of its fighters proved enormously difficult for the Egyptian government or British regiments to destroy, isolate, or contain. The idea
that a nomadic lifestyle, austerity, and simplicity promoted virtues, such as honesty and courage, has a long
tradition in Islam.
The 14th-century North African historian and
sociologist Ibn Khaldun describes sedentary people—
or city folk—as “colored with all kinds of blameworthy and evil qualities . . . not deterred by any sense of
restraint, because the bad custom of behaving openly
in an improper manner in both words and deeds has
taken hold of them.”30 Nomads, in contrast, “are closer
to the first natural state [of man] and more remote from
the evil habits that have been impressed upon the souls
(of sedentary people) through numerous and ugly,
blameworthy customs.”31 These ideas led Ibn Khaldun
to summarize that “Bedouins are closer to being good
than sedentary people,” “Bedouins are more disposed
to courage than sedentary people,” and “The reliance
of sedentary people upon laws destroys their fortitude
and power of resistance.”32 Thus, Bedouins, or desert
nomads who live in remote areas removed from civilization and government influence, are more free than
those who live in cities and large social groupings.33
Cities, civilizations, and populations by contrast are
corrupting influences requiring redemption. In other
words, desert and wilderness sanctuary promotes
freedom and redemption.
Ibn Khaldun also theorized about the relationship
between rural and urban, reasoning that states progress through five stages of development:
1. Success through military domination by a leader, normally from an armed revolution;
11

2. Consolidation of political power;
3. Consolidation of financial instruments, normally through the use of taxes;
4. Peace and productiveness; and,
5. Corruption and wastefulness resulting in grievances that lead to a new leader overthrowing
the established order.
He also reasoned that states are weakest at their
extremities, and the enemies of the state come from
the regions furthest from state control. Scholars have
found it “significant that all leaders of the jihad movements in West Africa came from the countryside and
not from commercial or capital towns.”34 The Muqaddimah provides historical and theoretical credibility to
Islamic revolutionaries and militants while harkening
to cognitive sanctuary, space to think freely. Cognitive
sanctuary could offer subtle clues to the ideology of
terrorists and the techniques they use to convert others
to their cause.35 Sanctuary in West Africa has deep cultural, social, and historical roots.
Sanctuary and Governance
The absence of governance often referred to
as ungoverned space or poorly governed spaces,
is imprecise and complicated because scholars and
practitioners discuss governance in a variety of contradictory and politically-charged ways. The concept of
a failed state implies a recognized threshold of statehood below that constituting state failure, although
there is no such consensus on what constitutes good
governance, or even governance. There are a range of
governance paradigms from the Westphalian International States System, “stateless” societies,36 and even
12

state “disorder.” Some researchers list state functions
as diverse as a monopoly on the legitimate means of
violence, administrative control, public finances management, human capital investment, citizen rights creation through social policy, provision of infrastructure
services, market formation, management of public
assets, and effective public borrowing.37 Sanctuary
from these sophisticated elements of modern governance could include protection from any of these
elements such as economic sanctuary, finance (tax)
sanctuary, institutional sanctuary, or legal sanctuary.
An unusual example of sanctuary-seeking to avoid
state control and governance is the “nation” of Sealand. British citizen Roy Bates declared independence
on September 2, 1967, on a World War II naval “sea
fort” seven miles offshore of the English coastline.38
While this sanctuary offers little physical refuge, it does
host a “data haven,” its main income-generating activity, and questions traditional concepts of governance.
The location of internet servers in Sealand alludes to
another form of sanctuary—virtual sanctuary—shelters from government and regulatory control in cyberspace. Virtual sanctuary is a growing threat as terrorist
groups are exploiting the accessibility, audience, and
anonymity of the internet to raise money, communicate, and recruit. For example, al-Qaeda’s publication
Al Battr was a virtual terrorist training camp:
Edition nine of the publication was devoted to
kidnappings. It suggests methods, potential targets,
negotiating tactics, and even directions on how to
videotape the beheading of victims and post the video on
the Web.39
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The “media guy” was an important member of
Belmokhtar’s group and was present for the major
events during Ambassador Robert Fowler’s captivity.
In the physical world, sanctuaries can be either
stationary or mobile. Stationary sanctuaries can be
supported by states, such as North Vietnam, or exist
due to lack of state control in sanctuary areas such
as in Mao’s case. State sanctuary requires the knowledge and support of a state actor and the legal framework and binding nature of international agreements.
Nonstate sanctuaries, such as those in Northern Mali,
are due to poor government control and security of
those state-administered areas. Mobile sanctuaries, as
Geronimo resorted to employing, are sanctuaries that
cross a wide region but cannot be pinpointed to a specific place or delineated by a particular area or zone
because the sanctuary-seeker constantly moves among
different spaces.
Like Mao, Belmokhtar used sanctuary in Northern
Mali for the purposes of protection and as his operational base to conduct logistical activities, command
and control, planning, and training. Unlike Mao, however, Belmokhtar also used sanctuary for a range of
criminal enterprises, such as smuggling and hostage
taking. Belmokhtar also engaged in civil affairs operations, such as providing support to local populations,
but had to recruit new fighters in distant urban areas
via internet messaging and the influence of radical
leaders rather than locals in the sanctuary area.40
The price of utilizing one sanctuary area over
another involves a variety of costs besides the financial burden of operational expenditures and includes
the rent for the sanctuary paid by gifts to the local
population, cash donations, or even loans. There is an
opportunity cost in time to develop and maintain close
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relationships with the myriad of local power brokers,
and even perhaps marriage, in order to solidify alliances. These relationships and locations are likely to
involve certain risk, a cost hidden from analysis, yet
essential to determine the operational reach of the
organization. To deny or control sanctuary requires
an understanding of what benefits the terrorists are
receiving, as well as what the sanctuary costs them.
Attacking the benefits will deny terrorists the underlying purpose of the sanctuary. Attacking the cost, or
raising the rent, could make the price of using that
sanctuary either unacceptable or untenable.
TERRAIN: GEOGRAPHIC AND HUMAN CHARACTERISTICS OF SAHARAN SANCTUARY
The word “desert” connotes emptiness, absence,
desertion, and is associated with extreme heat. It
should come as no surprise that most people associate
desert with a barren wasteland; the word desert, after
all, is the root of deserted. At more than 3 1/2 million
square miles—the largest desert on earth and almost
big enough to swallow the territory of three continental United States—many imagine the Sahara as the
world’s largest barren wasteland. This simplistic view
is reflected in the cartography of American military
maps of Saharan regions: most 1:250,000 scale “Joint
Operational Graphic” in this region use contour intervals of 100 meters and are based upon hand-drawn data
more than 50 years old. Some areas remain uncolored
from the lack of certainty in the geographic information portrayed. The lack of precision and accuracy in
these representations of the Saharan landscape reflects
the American military’s general lack of interest in the
Sahara and serves to reinforce our conceptions that the
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barrenness of the desert and harsh climate equates to
an abject lack of terrain—physical or human.
These preconceived notions of the Sahara and associations of emptiness are gross misrepresentations of
the geology, ecology, and economy of the world’s largest desert. The Sahara has open expanses of dunes towering more than 600 feet tall, huge dry lakebeds and
salt flats, vast networks of dry washes or wadis, volcanic mountain ranges approaching 10,000 feet above
sea level, high limestone plateaus, granite mountain
ranges, and large plains covered with sharp gravel.
Those who live in the desert have dozens of words to
describe the different textures, colors, and even flavors
of the sand and rock around them. The size and variation of the Sahara create large temperature and climatic
variations as well as some of the largest sandstorms
on Earth. The geologic history of the region gives the
Sahara an enormous biodiversity, from migratory elephants who roam the desert and grasslands in northern
Mali, to desert crocodiles in Mauritania who borough
deep in the desert sands.
The inaccuracies of U.S. maps of the Sahara are
reflections of the errors in our mental maps of the
region—how we perceive the terrain. These mental
maps are important in how we see the world around
us and hence respond to it. For example, Parisians
often say that there is a tourist Paris and a real Paris.
The geography is the same, but the human experience
and impressions of the terrain are quite different for
those influenced by prepackaged images of Paris and
those who live in the complex human terrain.41 Most
existing American military maps do not differentiate
between moving sand dunes, terrain elevation changes
less than 300 feet, caves and ravines carved into the
rocky desert floor, flat expanses of rocky outcrops
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impassible by wheeled vehicles, and sinkhole-prone
ancient lakebeds. More significant than shortfalls in
physical geography, however, is that these maps do
not aid planners to understand the layers and connections of human terrain of the Sahara. Our mental
maps largely are dominated by a western, temperate,
and metropolitan experience with a poverty of knowledge about the people who live in the Sahara. Most
assume such barren landscapes are barren of people,
and social groups in these places are therefore nonexistent or inconsequential.
Geographic Terrain
The Adrar des Ifoghas is a large massif in Mali’s
Kidal Region, characterized by wide, shallow valleys, and small mountains strewn with piles of sharp
eroded granite blocks, covering about 100,000 square
miles and extending into the Hoggar region of Southern Algeria. The massif’s valleys open to the Tamesna
plain on the east, to the Telemsi fosse on the west, the
western basin of the Azaouak valley on the south, and
the Tanezrouft in the north. Settlements include Kidal,
Aguelhok, Boghassa, Essouk, and Tessalit.
Aguelhok, a city of approximately 8,000 inhabitants,
is located about 70 miles north across a desert track from
the city of Kidal, and about the same distance south of
the city of Tessalit. Tessalit and Aguelhok both have
airfields, but Kidal is the nearest paved airstrip. Aguelhok is in the northern end of the Tilemsi Valley that
runs south from Tessalit into the Niger River at the city
of Gao. The low but steep granite mountains and dry
wash networks rise on both sides of the river valley,
west and east of Aguelhok respectively. Aguelhok’s
temperatures range from low 50 degrees Fahrenheit in
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the winter, to well over 110 degrees Fahrenheit in the
summer, with extreme temperatures dropping below
freezing and exceeding 120 degrees Fahrenheit. The
desert winds can reach 40 miles an hour, and sandstorms can last hours, making movement impossible.
Dry riverbeds with their high rock walls, crags, overhangs, and caves offer a multitude of places to provide
excellent cover and concealment for people and equipment. In the words of AQIM: “That [Adrar des Ifoghas
massif] is our Tora Bora.”42
Ageulhok receives an average of 4.5 inches of rainfall per year, the majority in August that normally
sees 2 inches, while the driest months of February
and March normally receive no rain. Rainfall patterns
require an annual trek for those living in the Aguelhok
area to lands closer to the Niger River, possibly as far
south as the cities of Bourem or Gao, a distance more
than 200 miles. These southwardly spring migrations
burden people living in the Niger River basin and
often cause conflicts due to livestock grazing rights.
Northern areas like Aguelhok are sparsely populated
during these migrations, and there is little livestock
or food available in the dry months. Weather causes
these migrations so they can last an entire year during
a drought, as in 2012, which may foment violence
between groups converging on grazing pasture.
The Sahara is also prone to large rainfall fluctuations. More than a century of rainfall data from the
Sahel and Sahara show an unusually wet period from
1950 until 1970, followed by extremely dry years from
1970 to 1990. From 1990 until the present day, rainfall
returned to levels slightly below the 1898–1993 average, but year-to-year variability remains high. The
most recent droughts occurred in 2012 after one of the
most severe droughts on record in 2010.43 The droughts
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over the past 50 years have placed severe strain on
the pastoral populations in the Sahara who normally
migrate with their herds to the southern Sahel regions
during dry periods, and climatic factors are significant
elements in conflicts.44
The geologic structure of the Adrar des Ifoghas
massif also plays an important role because the granite rock captures rainwater in underground channels
and pools beneath the sand, allowing people to tap
into these water sources through a network of wells.
These wells are essential for life in the Sahara: daily
life revolves around the well. Control of these wells,
therefore, is a basic and essential security concern for
landowners. Water sources are connected directly
to livelihood, and defending these wells is a right of
self-defense: “each hill and valley in it had a man who
was its acknowledged owner and would quickly assert
the right of his family or clan to it, against aggression.
Even the wells and trees had their masters.”45 A 1952
study, commissioned by the U.S. Combat Studies Institute on desert warfare lessons learned by the German
Army in World War II, forthrightly stated that availability of water is the decisive factor for desert operations.46 During the same period, the British army used
prepositioned water and ammunition stocks as one of
the factors to determine their scheme of maneuver in
operating against the German Army in North Africa.47
Belmokhtar understood the critical importance of
water—washing is discretionary but drinking is not,
even for his hostages.48 Water was never to be wasted,
and sand is used instead of water for washing purposes, to include ablutions before prayer. Ambassador
Fowler observed his group performed a “water run”
every 3 days, which would take 1 to 2 days to complete. He recorded an example of such a water resupply
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when the group stopped in the “middle of a flat, featureless expanse of desert” at an “improved well” with
a cement lip rising a meter from the ground. Sentries
were posted, and the group manually retrieved water
from the well, dumping buckets into containers oneby-one, very alert and vigilant, as they understood
their vulnerability when stopping to resupply water.
This group avoided contact with local populations,
and their choice for a watering hole was one that was
clearly remote and unobserved.49
Human Terrain
Adrar is a Berber word signifying mountain, while
Ifogha is the name of an aristocratic Tuareg clan, the
Kel Ifoghas. Some historians have argued that the Kel
Ifoghas date to the Roman Empire.50 It is commonly
accepted that the Saharan desert was unpopulated
before the first century after the Common Era (C.E.)
when dromedaries were introduced into North Africa,
enabling long distance trans-Saharan treks. The Kel
Ifoghas are not the only Tuareg group in the Adrar
region: Kel Afella, Iredganaten, Ibatanaten, Chemenammas, Kel Essuk, Ifergumessen, Idnan, Taghat
Melet, Kel Ghala, Kel Ouuzzeyn, and Kel Taghlit
are distinct ethnic identities identified in the Tilemsi
Valley.51 Some ethnographers do not differentiate
between the Adagh Tuaregs and the Ahaggar Tuaregs
who live to the north in the Hoggar Mountain range
of the Tamanrasset region in Southern Algeria. The
term Adagh Tuareg is often used interchangeably with
Azawagh Tuareg, a separate group locally known as
the Iwllemmedan Tuareg, a group further divided into
the Iwllemmeden Kel Dennek and the Iwllemmeden
Kel Ataram.52 The use of the term Tuareg creates
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significant confusion, as the Tuareg themselves do
not identify themselves as Tuareg, but by their tribe
or clan name. The word Tuareg is actually a derogatory term of Arabic origin, Tareq, allegedly meaning
“those who have abandoned God.” The inherent challenge in categories like Tuareg leads most anthropologists to use tribe or clan names, such as Kel Adagh, or
a much broader term encompassing all tribes such as
Kel Tamasheq (“those who speak Tamasheq”53). This
monograph focuses on the groups living in the Adrar
des Ifoghas and will simply use the popular term
Tuareg for the broader Kel Tamasheq people.
Tuareg class structure is defined by social roles.
Nobles, the Ihaggaren, serve as protectors in exchange
for payments by the Imghad, or the vassals. The relationship between the Ihaggaren and Imghad is more
complex, however, because of the various roles each
plays and the different types of payments or tribute.
For example, Imghad can serve as warriors, and hence
have noble status, but cannot exact tribute. The Iklan,
or Bellah, constitute an indentured servant, or slave,
class.54 In addition, there are other ethnic groups in the
region such as Arabs, like the Maurs and Berbeshe;
but also black or African groups, such as the Songhai,
Fulbe, Sonike, Dogon, Bamana, and Hausa.
The Tuareg social system is significant because of
its closed nature, often referred to as a caste system.
A true caste system, however, requires socially ranked
groups associated with particular occupations where
membership is determined at birth, and marriage is
restricted to members of the like caste.55 While often
discussed in these terms, the reality of Tuareg social
interactions and organizations are much more fluid,
varied, and subject to interpretation. Some groups are
matrilineal, while others are patrilineal; some groups
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have remained exclusive of others, while some have
changed significantly over time.56 These relationships
are difficult to study, understand, and categorize since
they are dynamic: individual and group identities are
constantly changing within a framework of family
identities, social segments, and alliances.57
Linguistic studies indicate the Tuareg have been
in North Africa for thousands of years. Tamasheq,
the language of the Tuareg, is a family of very closely
related languages and dialects, understood in large
parts of Mali, Niger, Algeria, and Libya. These dialects belong to the South Berber language group, and
they are commonly regarded as a single language distinguished mainly by a few sound shifts. The Tuareg
varieties are unusually conservative in some respects;
they retain two short vowels where Northern-Berber
languages have one or none and have a much lower
proportion of Arabic loanwords than most Berber languages.58 The word afri, the Latin term for the Carthaginian Berber speaking people who inhabited parts of
modern-day Tunisia and Libya, is the root for the word
Africa. While Tamasheq can be written with either
Latin or Arabic script, it has its own alphabet resembling ancient Syro-Phoenician script—the precursor
of the first modern alphabet system, classical Greek.
Ethnographers largely agree that today’s Tuareg are
descendants from Berber tribes who arrived in North
Africa several thousand years Before the Common Era
(B.C.E.).
Therefore, categorical propositions about Tuareg
society should be treated with suspicion. The flexibility of local narratives and social modes testify to the
adaptability of the Tuareg, an adaptability that has
often been interpreted as heresy or untrustworthiness:
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The Tuareg, like their neighbors on all sides, are Moslem.
They are noted, however, as infamous and unregenerate
back-sliders who observe neither proper law nor custom,
who misperform the ritual postures in prayer, fail to
make ablutions, eat and drink during the fasting days
of Ramadan, and who have few of the wise and holy in
their ranks. Despite the best Tuareg efforts to simulate
orthodoxy in the presence of their censorious neighbors,
these charges are substantially true.59

The obstinate persistence and endurance of these desert
nomads account for their value of independence and
was a critical factor in their ability to conduct long-distance trade across the Sahara. Their pastoral life patterns, overland routes, and trade networks, were built
upon the desert well systems and watering holes,
crisscrossing the length and breadth of the Sahara, and
likely have remained largely unchanged for hundreds,
possibly thousands of years. Historians have established that this trade network included the NorthSouth route from the city of Gao, along the Niger River
through the Tilemsi Valley, and then north across the
desert into present day Algeria. This locates Ageulhok
along well-established and historical trade routes for
lucrative products like gold, salt, and slaves.60 Therefore, commerce has been the primary occupation for
hundreds, even thousands, of years, and it gave rise to
the banditry that reinforced the protector-vassal class
distinctions. The rugged and difficult terrain offers
countless locations for bandits, smugglers, and criminals to hide, while the geology provides limited water
supplies. A former British soldier, traveling across the
Sahara by foot in 1986, found that the Tuaregs of the
lower Tilemsi Valley were suspicious of him.61
The Kel Adagh have been the cornerstone of
the Tuareg rebellions in Mali since independence,62
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including: 1962–1964, 1990–1995, 2007–2009, and most
recently in 2012 with the Kel Adagh rebel group,
National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
(MNLA), operating simultaneously with Islamic militant groups, such as AQIM and Ansar Dine. After
seizing Timbuktu and other cities in April 2012, the
MNLA declared Azawad’s independence from Mali.
However, after the French military intervention in
February 2013, the MNLA renounced their claim of
independence for Azawad. The perception by Malians
that the Kel Adagh are criminals and troublemakers
persists: “It is evident that in the Adagh, the Ifoghas
are the only tribal group still capable of creating tensions between tribes.”63
AQIM exists in an alien society: there were few, if
any, Tuaregs in AQIM, Ambassador Fowler noting,
“none of our captors appeared to be Tuareg.”64 Also
noteworthy were the racial divides within Belmokhtar’s
fighters: despite Islam’s unifying message, racism
seemed to be a substantial problem in an organization led mostly by white North Africans. Ambassador
Fowler noted, “There was a big gulf between those
who were black and those who were not,” which constituted a distinct, if informal, hierarchy since “officers
were almost all Algerian,” while “enlisted men were
from sub-Saharan countries or very young Algerians.”65 AQIM is racially mixed but ethnically divided,
where “racism is a problem,” with very few local or
indigenous members with the sanctuary-seekers.66
Belmokhtar and his group could not easily blend in
with local nomadic tribesmen and may have had problems even communicating with them. Furthermore,
their extremist activities and ideology are not compatible with traditional Tuareg practices. For example, many groups are matrilineal—not congruent with

24

Salafist preaching calling for an absolute return to the
literal teachings of Mohammed. Tuareg rebels, such as
the Nigerien Movement for Justice (MNJ), do not identify with the religious precepts of Islamic fundamentalists.67 Two French journalists held captive by the MNJ
in December 2007 asked about the MNJ’s identification
with jihad and Islam. The MNJ rebels responded, “We
have nothing to do with these extremists. Everyone
practices their religions at their own convenience. My
journeys have nothing to do with religion.”68
SANCTUARY SEEKERS IN THE SAHARA
Mokhtar Belmokhtar is from a group of Algerian
terrorists known as the Afghani who fought against
the Soviet Army in Afghanistan and returned to Algeria. From the perspective of Belmokhtar and the other
Algerian Afghani, the tide was receding on secular
and Western governments, and they founded a violent extremist organization named the Islamic Armed
Group (GIA) after the 1992 secular military coup in
Algeria.69 This coup voided the democratically elected
Islamist government of the Islamic Salvation Front, the
largest Islamic opposition party in Algeria, after the
first round of legislative elections held in December
1991.
The GIA grew into a notoriously violent organization renowned for torturing and indiscriminately
killing Muslim civilians. The GIA, like its famous
predecessor from the Algerian war of independence
against France, the National Liberation Front (FLN),
operated in areas largely outside of government control, such as the difficult and mountainous terrain of
the Algerian Atlas.70 These mountain sanctuary areas
had provided protection for FLN insurgents fleeing
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from French forces, as well as places to train and equip
fighters, plan, organize, and prepare operations. In
addition to these operational functions, the FLN sanctuary areas were an important political demonstration
of Algerian solidarity against France and the establishment of a legitimate Algerian government. They provided social services to Algerians, including Islamic
marriages, legal processes such as settling of disputes
and claims, and even charitable distribution.
Many in the GIA, including Belmokhtar, worked
with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan and must have
been aware of bin Laden’s activities to establish the
al-Qaeda brand and organization in Sudan. This close
relationship between bin Laden, the al-Qaeda franchise,
and the GIA is made strikingly evident when the GIA
hijacked Air France Flight 8969, from Algiers to Paris,
in December 1994.71 Algerian security services placed
enormous pressure on the GIA, and the Algerian military became very adept at using helicopters to move
troops rapidly to remote locations and raid sanctuary
areas. The effectiveness of these operations, and fear
of helicopters, is lasting and real. A Senegalese terrorist who kidnapped Ambassador Fowler remarked, “If
the government helicopters find us before dark, we are
all dead.”72 The Algerian military’s successful tactics
of pursuit and penetration, supported by intelligence
activities and robust policing, pushed the GIA from
loss to desperation, and then increased violence. This
spiraling violence alienated the population, however,
and isolated the GIA from local and foreign support.
The success of the Algerian government and demise of
the GIA gave birth to the Salafist Group for Preaching
and Combat (GSPC); a new organization inspired more
by contemporary transnational terrorism formulated
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by Osama bin Laden than the historical FLN freedom
fighting.73
The GSPC formed in 1998 as a breakaway movement of the GIA that had been neutralized by an
amnesty and disarmament deal with the Algerian
government. Throughout this period, however,
Belmokhtar and other GIA fighters had been pushed
south out of the Atlas Mountains by Algerian military
pressure. Belmokhtar was likely well established in
Northern Mali by the time GSPC was created, and his
turn southward should have been expected. “One of
the best known warlords of the Sahara,” Belmokhtar
was raised in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) world
heritage site of Ghardaia, a walled city which lies in
the M’Zab Valley in Eastern Algeria, which provides
clues to Belmokhtar’s logic. Ghardaia was founded by
an Islamic sect of Berbers, known as the Ibadis, whose
purist doctrine dominated part of the Maghreb during
the 10th century. After their capital, Tahert, was
destroyed by fire in 909 C.E., they settled first at Sedrata
and finally in the M’Zab Valley. UNESCO notes that,
under military pressure, the Ibadis built these fortified
cities in the M’Zab because of the “defensive possibilities that it offered a community that was concerned
with its own protection and fiercely dedicated to the
preservation of its identity, even at the expense of isolation.”74 Ghardaia, in short, offered the Ibadis protection because of its isolation and fortification, similar
to the kind of sanctuary Belmokhtar sought from the
Algerian security and military services in the 1990s.
Throughout this period, Belmokhtar increasingly
participated in criminal enterprises, including smuggling cigarettes, food, and fuel. In time, these activities
expanded into schemes that were more lucrative, such
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as smuggling narcotics and kidnapping for ransom.
The first significant such kidnapping action in the
Sahara was by a GIA member named El Para who kidnapped 32 European tourists in Algeria in 2003 and
eventually was chased and captured in Chad. He was
extradited to Algeria where he remains in custody. El
Para’s kidnap-for-ransom scheme established a model
for Saharan terrorists to emulate later.
GSPC changed their name to AQIM in early 2007
and formalized their relationship and allegiance to
Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda franchise. There
have been many arguments regarding the significance
of this name change. Some have reasoned that it was
merely a tactic by GSPC to garner additional attention,
notoriety, and support from al-Qaeda.75 Others have
made the case that GSPC and AQIM were actually
tools of the Algerian security services to promote their
security-focused agenda, clamp down on local opposition to President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, and gain additional U.S. support.76 Still others have offered evidence
that AQIM is not a terrorist organization, but opportunistic profiteering in the name of Islam.77
Algerian journalist Mohamed Mokeddem has
provided substantial evidence that AQIM is fundamentally a transnational trafficking network.78 This
argument is very convincing, especially with the
well-documented nexus between cocaine smuggling
and AQIM. This thesis presumes, however, that AQIM
is driven by profit motive and not ideology. The actions
of Abu Zaid, and many AQIM fighters, who died fighting in the opening stages of the French intervention, as
well as the goals of AQIM and beliefs of its members,
indicate they are true believers. Ambassador Fowler
emphasizes the total commitment of Belmokhtar’s
group to jihad and not personal gain.79 The fact that
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cocaine smuggling generated vast sums of money, and
that AQIM members admitted kidnapping was “all
about ransom (about, that is, raising money for the
cause) for jihad,”80 indicate that these for-profit activities had specific, calculated purposes based upon material requirements while grossly simplifying the term
“banditry.”81 Mohamed Mokeddem’s argument begs
the question, “Why does Belmokhtar’s group require
so much cash (and, therefore, engage in so many money-making schemes)?” The answer is most likely the
most obvious and perhaps most mundane: Security
concerns drove Belmokhtar into the deep desert, but
criminal enterprise provided the means to pay for it,
as well as future attacks. Belmokhtar had to engage in
criminal enterprise to fund both AQIM terrorist operations, as well as pay the rent for sanctuary.
Sanctuary as Protection
The FLN used mountain hideaways in the Atlas
for a variety of purposes, including: operational and
strategic planning, training, and hiding weapons and
supplies. These locations were effectively outside the
span of control of government forces, and French military forces won the battle of Algiers due to superior
firepower and technology—including radio communications, artillery, helicopters, and close air support
aircraft—to dominate parts of Algeria, particularly
metropolitan centers. Aggressive patrolling and intelligence gathering—to include the famous use of torture—provided critical insight into FLN operations.82
These early defeats forced the FLN to adapt their tactics to seek sanctuary further from urban areas, but
more importantly, to change their strategy to bring the
war to domestic France and to seek wider international
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attention and condemnation of French human rights
violations.83 The FLN’s strategic shift, and not better
tactics or operational reach, ended the French Fourth
Republic, and eventually gained independence for
Algeria.
Belmokhtar moved to the Sahara for similar reasons his ancestors in the 11th century moved to M’Zab
Valley, fleeing superior military force. Today, Algerian
military forces use modern technology and combined
arms maneuvers with air power to fight terrorists and
insurgents like AQIM.84 After traveling to make cell
phone calls, Belmokhtar informed Ambassador Fowler
that, “To make such calls from their satellite-phones
would be to invite an Algerian air strike.”85 In fact,
Algeria used helicopters in response to the attack on
the Algerian In Amenas oil facility in 2013. The attackers clearly feared the aircraft, as they demanded the
Algerians ground them.86 AQIM is well informed
about the technical capabilities of Algerian military
forces, such as electronic surveillance and air power.87
The importance of air power in modern desert warfare
is not new, however; Field Marshal Erwin Rommel
remarked about “the paralyzing effect which air activity on such a scale had on motorized forces.”88
The key reason why Belmokhtar moved his operation into Northern Mali was the inability of GIA,
and later the GSPC and AQIM, to maintain secrecy
or adequate operational security, from Algerian intelligence services. Poor operational security rendered
these groups defenseless when surprised and overwhelmed by the capabilities of Algerian military and
security forces, most notably air power. Aguelhok is
outside the range of attack helicopters like the Russian
Mi-35 “Hind D” which could operate from Southern
Algeria. To reach Belmokhtar, Algeria would have to
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put troops into Mali, something they did in late 2011.89
The nearest paved runway to Belmokhtar’s sanctuary
is at Gao, which is outside the range of rotary-wing
close air support. While much faster and higher-flying
attack aircraft could strike locations around Aguelhok,
these aircraft would need detailed target information
normally provided by ground reconnaissance units or
surveillance drones. Such information would be very
difficult for the Algerians or the Malians to obtain
with current reconnaissance resources, and it remains
highly unlikely such surveillance could remain undetected for long. Aguelhok provided a cloak from curious governments for Belmokhtar’s operations, refuge
from hot pursuit, and safety from government security
forces.
Sanctuary for Training and Planning
Mobility requires competent drivers who are used
to driving in these conditions. The ability to traverse
the varied and difficult terrain in the region, as well as
navigate using stars and landmarks, means good drivers are essential—and difficult to train and replace.
Remote desert cache locations are useless if you cannot
find them, and quick egresses are fatal if you get hopelessly lost in the desert and run out of fuel and water.
Additionally, AQIM fighters proved to be deficient
when using modern navigation technology.90 Competent and skilled drivers, who also maintain the vehicles
and direct maintenance efforts, are critical ingredients
to this logistics system.
Belmokhtar’s group used a variety of communication security protocols, including moving locations
and avoiding telecommunications altogether if possible. Vehicles would move a day’s distance to perform
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tasks such as communication.91 It can be inferred that
communicators either would move to use their satellite phones from a different location or connect to a
local cell phone tower. It also seems likely AQIM used
runners or messengers for communications, requiring
large amounts of time and effort to facilitate communication. Other tactical communications are simple,
however, such as using the flashing of headlights to
meet at predetermined places or even small radios to
guide into a secured area.92
Belmokhtar’s core group of fighters—referred to
as les frères—accounted for approximately 60 fighters.
This many fighters required at least 12 vehicles, 12
heavy weapons, and around 100 assorted small arms
as well as all the fuel, water, and ammunition to support them. The number of facilitators, individuals who
assist with logistic functions, as well as trained and
loyal individuals in the immediate vicinity or even further afield who could be called upon for larger operations, is unknown. These trained and loyal individuals
could be equipped quickly with additional weapons
and equipment hidden in the desert and mobilized for
combat. Some studies indicate there are twice as many
key facilitators as core fighters and three times the
number of core fighters in an “operational reserve.”93
Thus, 200 fighters and another 100 facilitators comprised the entire Belmokhtar fighting organization at
the time of Ambassador Fowler’s capture.94 Fighters
require training. Images available of posing AQIM
fighters portray disciplined jihadists who are proficient in tactical planning and basic fire and movement
techniques. Ambassador Fowler noted that experienced fighters would often perform opportunity training with the youngsters, which consisted primarily of
basic fire and movement drills or small unit tactics,
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emphasizing physical fitness and utilizing the rocky
desert terrain for tactical advantage.95 Belmokhtar and
his fighters are proficient in basic defensive security
measures, such as the use of terrain for masking movement or providing observation and 360-degree security.96 While there is no first-hand information available
about other types of combat training, such as marksmanship and weapons proficiency training, it is evident that both formal and informal weapons training
is conducted—particularly because of the importance
of accurately employing direct fire over long distances
in the desert. Drivers are trained through a mentorship
process, as well as on-the-job training.97 Training and
experimentation with explosives must be performed in
order to construct the various devices that are used,
ranging from truck bombs to suicide vests.
Analysis of videos and historical information
about events, such as the combined MNLA and AQIM
assault on the Malian military garrison at Aguelhok,
demonstrate that these groups understand tactical
planning and the importance of rehearsals. This composite group of fighters never trained or operated
together previously and successfully besieged the garrison on January 18, 2012, 2 days later evading Malian
air strikes, while establishing a blocking position that
successfully defeated an armed relief column.98 Video
from the dawn assault on the garrison on January 25
shows an attacking force that was disciplined, wellarmed, well-coordinated, informed by intelligence or
personal knowledge of the terrain, and may have conducted rehearsals.99 The assault force moved quickly
into assault positions and breach points based upon
the garrison’s defensive weaknesses, while being
covered by direct fire. This battle demonstrates, even
though it was not exclusively Belmokhtar’s forces, that
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the violent groups operating in this region understand
tactics and the use of terrain and fires, operational
planning, and logistics. Such proficiency has been
demonstrated numerous times, as in the kidnapping
of Ambassador Fowler or the attack on the In Amenas
oil facility in Southern Algeria.
The dispersion of supplies over a wide area, lack
of efficient communications, and reliance on a limited
number of skilled drivers and vehicles requires planning and time in order to execute large operations.
Belmokhtar’s logistical system offered a large amount
of short-term tactical flexibility and speed, but sacrificed operational scale and reach. Belmokhtar’s operations remained limited in range and finite in scope,
while requiring thorough planning and coordination.
Belmokhtar probably only had enough manpower,
equipment, and experience available to manage one
major operation, while planning two to three others.
Furthermore, his group could be overextended easily in
resources and control when engaged in current operations. Fleeing hot pursuit would have likely consumed
his readily available supplies and greatly constrained
his freedom of action. It would take additional time and
resources to resupply and refit. In sum, Belmokhtar’s
operational reach was limited and largely constrained
by his logistical system of dispersed cache sites and
resources, such as fuel and water.
Sanctuary provides protection from hot pursuit, but is not a fortress. Mobile sanctuary is a series
of places covering a wide space, which allowed
Belmokhtar to evade detection and capture through
speed and unpredictability. The cost to pay for sanctuary comes in many forms, whether financial costs
for supplies and equipment or social costs for access
and influence to local decision makers. Payments may
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be distinct—sometimes cash, sometimes goods or services, and sometimes social obligations like marriage.
Social costs are important, but probably can be offset
with other forms of payment—requiring cash. The lack
of significant external sponsorship means these groups
must finance their operations creatively by harnessing
profitable criminal activities. Omar Ould Hamaha, the
jihadist who captured and held Ambassador Fowler
for Belmokhtar, publicly announced that AQIM did not
receive external support or funding, claiming AQIM
“has no need of Qatar and has not been financed by
Qatar. God provides our funding.”100 Yet the historical
record is clear that it was crime, and not God, which
provided funds to pay for operational and sanctuary
rent costs, the nexus between crime and terrorism.101
The Logistics of Saharan Sanctuary
U.S. Army General Omar Bradley once remarked
“Amateurs study tactics; professionals study logistics.”102 The importance of logistics is not limited to
military operations, however. The British expedition
that summited Mount Everest, for example, was managed and led by John Hunt, an experienced English
military officer, who brought meticulous planning and
robust logistical support, as well as new technology,
(like closed-circuit oxygen) to an expedition lasting
several months, numbering more than 400 personnel,
and requiring more than 7 tons of equipment and supplies.103 Deliberate planning and logistics rather than
the physical abilities of the climbers themselves were
decisive in reaching the summit after decades of failed
attempts and lost climbers.
The first motorized expedition to cross the Saharan desert demonstrated the utility of technological
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innovations to operate in the harsh and remote Northern Mali. On December 17, 1922, French mechanical engineer and automotive pioneer André Citroën
launched an expedition of half-tracks he designed
to traverse the difficult terrain from Algeria to Timbuktu. This first motorized crossing of the Sahara took
21 days and relied upon extensive maps and aerial
reconnaissance provided by the French military. These
half-tracked vehicles were the basis of the U.S. Army
M2 and M3 half-tracks of World War II, and each carried a heavy machine gun while team members were
equipped with pistols and rifles for self-defense since
the region had been dangerous for a long time. The
team was self-sufficient and carried almost all their
supplies, including: food, water, and fuel, while military aircraft occasionally flew overhead to provide
observation and emergency communication. The
team arrived in Timbuktu on January 7, 1923, to much
fanfare.104 Technical feats of mechanical engineering
were repeated later in daring automobile endurance
races such as the Paris-Dakar rally raid, which began
trans-Saharan races in 1978 but stopped in Africa due
to threats from AQIM in 2008.
Instead of tracked or heavily modified race vehicles, groups in the Sahara today use the Toyota Land
Cruiser or smaller Hilux models.105 These vehicles
were used extensively in the “Toyota War,” the Libyan-Chadian conflict from 1978 until 1987, and they
continue to be used today by virtually everyone, such
as tourists, nongovernmental organizations, embassies, and traffickers.106 Toyotas are not unique to
Africa, and American soldiers have encountered them
in Iraq and Afghanistan. These trucks are exceptionally reliable and have a well-established reputation
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for simplicity, robustness, functionality, and relatively
cheap maintenance.
AQIM has proven highly proficient in using these
trucks in the desert, and insights about vehicular
operations in this region can be gained by examining
expeditions and rally races. Whether Citroën’s 1920s
half-tracks or 1990s Paris-Dakar racers, carrying sufficient supplies to traverse the myriad of Saharan surfaces, enough equipment to self-recover, and supplies
to survive has proven critical. The logistical requirements for these expeditions and races across the Sahara
are consistent with military experiences: German Army
commanders in North Africa during World War II, for
example, required troops to carry all supplies during
combat operations, while fuel and ammunition was
stored at widely scattered points—buried and camouflaged.107 These experiences reflect the techniques and
procedures of smugglers, criminals, and groups like
AQIM that must self-sustain to survive.
The need to perform vehicle maintenance for
self-sustainment poses its own challenges. Dust makes
vehicle maintenance constant but difficult; thorns
puncture tires, and sharp stones shred them. Ambassador Fowler noted changing tires was a routine
affair, and AQIM fixed flat tires and repaired bent tire
rims all night on one occasion.108 The average life of a
light truck tire is approximately 30,000 miles, but the
life expectancy of the same tires under the off-road
driving conditions in this region is around 12,000
miles. As such, AQIM maximizes tire life by driving
on tires until they are destroyed completely. Toyota
Land Cruisers can operate without a major overhaul
for several 100,000 miles if maintained properly, but
given the difficult conditions and hard driving, such
trucks will not last more than 5 years, and groups who
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rely upon these vehicles for quick getaways need to
replace their vehicles every year or so, probably selling
older vehicles and purchasing new ones.109 This practice minimizes larger vehicle maintenance tasks such
as engine overhauls, gearbox and differential rebuilds,
and changing hubs. These tasks would require maintenance equipment that would be difficult, if not impossible, for AQIM to move across the Sahara.
Belmokhtar’s competent drivers were capable of
performing basic maintenance tasks, such as changing
fluids, filters, tires, and even suspension springs. They
could not do shop maintenance in the field, like that of
army units or race teams, however, because they did
not have the skills, experience, or tools. These groups
constantly had to replace used or destroyed vehicles
and incurred substantial cost. Determining logistical
requirements based upon vehicle capabilities and limitations in this environment can illuminate that these
operational costs are significant due to the wear-andtear of equipment. Belmokhtar operated vehicles day
and night, sometimes at speeds over 130 kilometers per
hour, for extended periods of time. He also traversed
very difficult terrain, including difficult rock formations, and even across plowed fields if necessary.110
Such operational costs, however, are not inclusive of
the rents needed for sanctuary, but do detract from
available funds. In other words, increasing operational
costs for sanctuary-seekers causes further difficulties
in paying the rent.
The U.S. Army employs a “push-pull” system of
field logistics. Services and support are pushed to forward locations from secure rear areas where equipment and parts are consolidated. This is known as a
hub and spoke system, where material is consolidated
at a hub and then moved along lines of communication
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or spokes. Currently, tactical prepositioning is not
used in the U.S. Army since units typically move forward across potentially hostile terrain and generally
seek to maintain a degree of freedom of maneuver,
operational flexibility, and security. This occasionally
requires air operations or other methods to “leapfrog” requirements, such as fuel, to maintain forward
momentum or conduct resupply operations through
field link-ups. Commercial desert races, such as the
Paris-Dakar, on the other hand, use a series of base
camps with extensive mobile maintenance services
prepositioned at various stages of the race, while the
race vehicles themselves often are trailed by support
vehicles and staff. The locations are all predetermined
and distances known so this method is practical for
minimizing the cost and complexity of maintenance,
rest, and refueling, while providing quick services and
additional safety for stranded vehicles.
Smugglers, such as Belmokhtar, cannot use a hub
and spoke system of logistics because it would require
having supporting infrastructure in place. This means
they would need to stockpile and warehouse parts,
keep mechanics and other technicians at hand, as well
as move the quantities of fuel and other equipment
rather quickly and efficiently—also requiring excellent communications. They cannot use the Paris-Dakar
model of logistics because that would require significant service and support capabilities, as well as restrict
their operational freedom to predetermined sites. Both
logistical models depend on secure and static areas
where logistic functions can be performed. Instead
of these relatively sophisticated logistics systems,
Belmokhtar uses a simple system of caching or hiding
needed material at many different predesignated locations spread across a wide area. The advantage of this
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system is that it allows Belmokhtar a great range of
operational freedom and agility—enabling his unpredictability and probably greatly contributing to his
survivability.
Belmokhtar’s vehicles carried two drums—one
with fuel and the other with water—swapping as
needed with filled drums hidden buried in the sand.111
All equipment was tied down in the vehicle, and
AK-47s were carried by everyone, including children,
at all times. Other small arms, such as PK belt-fed
machine guns, RPG-7s, and pistols were also readily
available and carried on the vehicles. Every fighter had
an ammo vest with 8 to 10 spare magazines kept close
at hand, and any items not carried such as additional
uniforms, weapons, and ammunition were buried
in the sand at cache points.112 Disadvantages of this
system include: the expense of maintaining dispersed
way stations throughout the region, the requirement
for local acquiescence for those sites (security), and the
inefficiency of dispersing equipment in many different
locations and difficulty to access (and perhaps find)
the right equipment in a timely manner.
The security for these caches was not free and
required substantial enterprise by Belmokhtar. He
married into local power hierarchies and furnished
services that the government did not provide. Ambassador Fowler noted at one friendly stop with locals:
These meet-and-greet interludes were obviously exercises
in community relations, something our captors knew
was important and unfailing good at. I suspect that the
nomads saw far more of and received more support―
however rudimentary―from Al-Qaeda warriors than
they ever got from government representatives.113
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In this way, Belmokhtar sought to replace functions
the state normally provides. These good-will gestures and support required a significant investment of
resources—time and money—by Belmokhtar. Fowler
noted that Belmokhtar was:
very careful about maintaining good relations with the
local population, sharing what little food and medicines
they had and generally treating the nomads with openness
and respect, a policy that clearly paid dividends.114

Belmokhtar’s group had to be self-reliant to recover
from illness or injury—one fighter had to go to a city
for several weeks to receive treatment from medicine
women or traditional healers who hung him upsidedown and beat his feet with sticks.115 Basic supplies,
such as medicine, were unavailable to Ambassador
Fowler during his captivity, and the medical supplies
he did have access to, such as vitamins, were specifically provided by external agents, such as the President of Burkina Faso or the Canadian government.
The diet of these groups is also austere. Ambassador Fowler estimated that his daily intake was less
than 1,000 calories and was largely based on dry foods,
such as rice or pasta. One fighter informed Ambassador Fowler: “We eat out of necessity, not pleasure.”116
Access to water remains essential: “When the theatre
of war is a desert with only a few scattered wells, water
becomes a matter of supply. . . . A failure of the water
supply means disaster, if not annihilation.”117 While
other supplies like food, ammunition, and even fuel
can be variable, water is absolutely critical and requires
constant resupply.
An analogy for desert operations comes from the
age of sailing, where relatively small ships crossed
vast oceans carrying all essential supplies required to
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get to the destination, and oftentimes with little or no
information about the outside world. The word Sahel
is derived from the Arabic term for shore, as the desert
nomads who crossed the Sahara referred to the green
lands south of Gao and Timbuktu on the Niger River
as the “shore” of the desert vis-à-vis the shores of the
Mediterranean from an ocean of sand. The importance
of logistics in the Sahara cannot be overstated.118
The Financing of Saharan Sanctuary
Sanctuary rent pays for popular support.
Belmokhtar contributed by being a friend to local
groups and by providing rent to the communities in
his sanctuary, including: cash payments, fuel, food,
even delivery of supplies for things like mosquito netting. Due to the rather large area Belmokhtar traversed
for operations and money-generating enterprises, it
is likely this cost was financially very high, as well as
in manpower and time consumed. This goodwill is
absolutely critical, but probably not sought from every
social group in this vast region. Instead, Belmokhtar
selects specific, probably small, groups who would
be most sympathetic to his cause—only support from
certain groups is required. Therefore, mobile sanctuary would appear as an archipelago of many distinct
islands of sanctuary in the Sahara.
Many of the traditional societies in the region differentiate between illegal and illicit activities. Illegal
smuggling, for example, is the trafficking of items
across borders without regulation or duty. Illegal
smuggling ranges from pasta to cigarettes. Illicit
smuggling includes trafficking in items that are widely
accepted as amoral or haram, such as narcotics or hostages. While essential items restricted from import
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and export, such as pasta, may arouse little interest,
illegal narcotics are socially destructive and serve no
beneficial purpose. They are actually banned in Islam.
Therefore, trafficking in such illicit items is generally
not accepted and (but was tolerated only under exceptional circumstances) even referred to in the region
as al frud or al-haram.119 While the transit networks
across the Sahara, largely following ancient well systems unchanged for hundreds of years, are similar
among illegal and illicit smuggling groups, the people
involved and modes of trafficking are distinct.
Hostages and narcotics movement techniques also
differ from illegal but licit trafficking. Belmokhtar used
a small number of heavily armed, light, and very fast
vehicles to traverse long distances, sometimes at night
with the headlights blacked out, conducting resupply
operations at remote cache sites. Terrorists avoided
contact with other people and traffic. By contrast,
smuggling and other commerce is conducted with
heavy trucks, at much slower speeds, and usually only
in the day. Drivers have social connections to families
and other drivers along the route and stop often to visit
friends and family.120 The merchants who smuggle to
make a buck for their families are entirely different in
social status, equipment, material to be smuggled, and
techniques than the terrorists who are smuggling to
fund their operations.121
Money also needs to be moved. AQIM claims it is
“all done with a few computer keystrokes—a simple
bank transfer . . . finished in 30 seconds.”122 Such bravado oversimplifies international banking and the limitations on transactions—and access to such funds in
the Saharan desert. Such money must be laundered
and moved to the sanctuary, probably through various
means including the hawala informal banking system
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and commodity exchanges such as new vehicles and
weapons. However, the specific payment mechanisms
for sanctuary, as well as methods for financing terrorist operations, require more study.123
DENIAL OF SANCTUARY: ENDS, WAYS, AND
MEANS
Vagueness in operational terminology and understanding has hindered progress to deny sanctuary. To
deny sanctuary suggests denial operations to dislocate,
isolate, disrupt, or destroy sanctuary-seekers. Sanctuary-seekers are assumed to be enemy forces, like terrorists, but distinctions between sanctuary-seekers,
sanctuary-owners, rent-seekers, enemy forces, and
others in the sanctuary area remain unclear. Contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine seeks to deny
sanctuary to insurgents and terrorists by establishing
security, restoring essential services, supporting democratic governance, and supporting economic and
infrastructure development. Terrorist sanctuary could
be denied by destroying terrorist forces or seizing key
terrain to prevent terrorists from using these zones
that would likely disrupt terrorist operations or dislocate them. This does not destroy the organization or
the local support to the organization, however, as the
French intervention in Mali has demonstrated.
AQIM understands the importance of plans and
alliances. “Alliances are essential,” wrote AQIM emir
Abdelmalek Droukdel when he counseled Belmokhtar
that his strategy should allow local groups to share
the burden of management for the jihad as well as any
blame for its failures.124 “The aim of building these
bridges,” Droukdel wrote, “is to make it so that our
Mujahedeen are no longer isolated in society, and to
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integrate with the different factions, including the big
tribes and main rebel movements and tribal chiefs.”125
The U.S. Army often uses the shorthand of endsways-means for strategic discourse,126 and Droukdel’s
admonishment indicates a profound understanding of
ends-ways-means:
Experience has shown that the application of Shariah
without calculating the consequences drives away local
population and sparks hatred against the Mujahedeen
and leads to the failure of any exercise.127

Droukdel acknowledged that Belmokhtar lived on
the fringes of Saharan society and urged him to make
alliances and pay the rents necessary to maintain
positive relationships with the local population, the
sanctuary-owners.
Denial of Sanctuary: Ends in Controlling Saharan
Sanctuary
Sun Tzu noted, “the highest realization of warfare
is to attack the enemy’s plans; next is to attack their
alliances; next to attack their army; and the lowest is
to attack their fortified cities.”128 Images of B-52 strikes
in the Tora Bora Mountains of Afghanistan or U.S.
soldiers fighting in the streets of Fallujah, Iraq, illustrate the difficulty in implementing Sun Tzu’s counsel.
While the Art of War is required reading for many students of strategy, U.S. efforts to deny sanctuary have
concentrated on attacking and destroying individuals
or strongholds rather than the plans and alliances of
terrorists.
AQIM’s sanctuary-seeking strategy seeks to
create alliances with groups having historical grievances against the local government in order to gain
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protection from security forces so they can conduct terrorist operations outside those sanctuary areas. Droukdel concluded, as Mao and Giap had, that the support
of the local population remains the center of gravity
when conducting anti-government activities. Raising
the rent seeks to control sanctuary areas by changing
the dynamics between sanctuary-seekers, rent-seekers, and sanctuary-suppliers as local popular support
is more transactional than ideological.
Planners must first determine what the object of
sanctuary is in order to determine the nature of the
transaction. France’s actions in Northern Mali indicate it determined the object of sanctuary was terrorist
protection and support to overthrow the Malian government. In turn, France sought to support the government and deny such sanctuary in Northern Mali
by eliminating the terrorists. This counterinsurgency
strategy, known popularly as the ink spot strategy,
was coined by British counterinsurgency thinkers and
used by the British in campaigns from South Africa to
Malaysia, although the term has been appropriated
recently by the U.S. Army in Iraq. When enemy forces
could not be located and isolated in South Africa and
Malaysia because of their mobility, the ink-spot campaign shifted focus to resettle local populations in
order to deny insurgents local support—as the U.S.
Army did with Geronimo. The U.S. applied the population resettlement scheme in Vietnam under the
name “strategic hamlet,” where it failed because resettlement only alienated the Vietnamese population.129
The center of gravity in the ink-spot scheme is neither
terrain nor enemy forces; but instead, the support, or
at least the acquiescence, of the local population. The
object of control is the enemy force and the method of
control is through the local population.
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The French campaign against AQIM did not actually deny terrorist sanctuary, but destroyed enemy
forces in sanctuary areas using superior military force.
Denying sanctuary is a nuanced objective revolving around control and requiring a practical understanding of the dimensions of control: the object, the
purpose, the nature, the degree, the scheme, and the
beginning and end of control.130
Denial of Sanctuary: Ways for Controlling Saharan
Sanctuary
The purposes of controlling the enemy are to destroy,
disrupt, or defeat enemy forces in the sanctuary area in
order to prevent them from conducting terrorist activities outside sanctuary. The purposes of controlling the
sanctuary rent would be to degrade, bankrupt, transform, integrate, or displace the sanctuary-seekers. This
scheme seeks to control sanctuary-seekers by attacking
their weaknesses, their financial and logistical vulnerabilities. The advantages to this scheme are numerous:
lower costs to the United States, building alliances
with local communities rather than alienating them
through attacks, and a greater degree of control of the
terrorist sanctuary-seekers themselves because sanctuary-seekers can be contained by knowing their location
and operational methodology. Controlling sanctuary
by raising the rent could also herd or displace terrorists into other low rent sanctuary areas. The purpose
of controlling Belmokhtar’s rent, therefore, would be
either to bankrupt the terrorist organization so it can
no longer function, or to displace them into a low rent
zone where there is a decreased risk of terrorist attack
due to decreased operational capability.
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Degrade and Bankrupt
Bankruptcy would raise rents to a level Belmokhtar
could no longer afford while continuing his terrorist
operations. This is the nature of control Algeria has
employed against GSPC and now AQIM in Northern
Algeria. AQIM in Algeria is no longer a functional terrorist organization because the pressure from Algerian
security forces have made it too difficult to conduct
terrorist operations in Algeria. Direct control by security forces has created an environment where the price
for AQIM to operate is too high. However, increasing
sanctuary rent to terrorists in places like Northern
Algeria comes at a high cost for the government and
is not feasible for the government to replicate in the
remote reaches of the Sahara. Raising the rent through
direct intervention would require engaging with community leaders and increasing the cost for the goods
and services Belmokhtar offers to these communities.
France has raised the rent through its military intervention in Northern Mali, but has done this by attacking terrorists directly rather than engaging with local
communities to delegitimize terrorist activities and
enable the government to support local populations.
Raising the rent seeks to create the friction between
landlords—those who profit from terrorist rents―and
owners—those who live with the terrorists. The social
disdain from illicit profits, such as drug smuggling and
human trafficking, is one way to disrupt Belmokhtar’s
existing alliance structure. Another would be to prevent cognitive sanctuary by engaging with community leaders on religious affairs—militant Islam is not
the only alternative to redress grievances.131 A final
way would be to attack his virtual sanctuary and prevent him from communicating to include recruiting
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and promoting violence and anti-government messages through the internet. These actions would force
Belmokhtar to reengage with the local communities
where he uses sanctuary and raise the rent to continue
to operate in those areas.
Transform and Integrate
Transformation from a terrorist organization into
a for-profit organization is possible. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, for example, has transformed from a revolutionary group to a terrorist group
into a criminal group, and today seeks peaceful resolution rather than violence. Social integration for AQIM
seems unlikely because they would need to transform
into a fundamentally different organization or abjectly
give up their jihadist identity to become integrated or
fused into local communities. Belmokhtar has never
demonstrated such an inclination, and the zeal of his
followers indicate commitment to jihad.132 AQIM actually mentions integration as a deception plan:
We should also take into consideration not to monopolize
the political and military stage. We should not be at the
forefront. . . . Better for you to be silent and pretend to
be a ‘domestic’ movement that has its own causes and
concerns. There is no reason for you to show that we
have an expansionary, jihadi, al Qaeda, or any other sort
of project.133

If anything, the pride of Belmokhtar and his fighters
could offer an alternative weakness: hubris. Furthermore, transformation or integration of violent groups
like Belmokhtar begs the question, “To what would it
be transformed?” Such predictions would be speculative, but the cure may be worse than the disease. A
highly profitable and organized transnational criminal
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enterprise in Northwest Africa could pose larger security concerns than the relatively small and dispersed
AQIM affiliates at present—as unpleasant as they are.
Transformation and integration do not seem viable
objectives for individuals like Belmokhtar, and such
objectives must be considered carefully.
Displace
If rents were raised even moderately, it is most likely
that Belmokhtar would seek new sanctuary areas with
greater protection, but lower rents so he would have
adequate funds to conduct terrorist operations. Thus,
a scheme to control sanctuary through increasing sanctuary rents in order to displace sanctuary-seekers provides a degree of indirect control over the terrorists by
disrupting their operations, degrading their capabilities, and potentially bankrupting them.
The nature of the sanctuary control explains how
the relevant actors are affected—understanding the
environment. These principal actors are the landlords,
or rent-seekers, and the tenants, or sanctuary-seekers. The owners or sanctuary providers and rent-payers are also important, depending upon the specific
circumstances of the rent and space relationship. In
Belmokhtar’s case, the sanctuary landlords are the
established local hierarchy that is a combination of
traditional leaders in ethnic groups, government officials exerting authority, and criminal networks or
local kingpins. The owners are the groups and families
who fall under the traditional leaders and could exert
increased power under pressure, particularly to raise
the rents as they see little direct benefits from the sanctuary rent relationships.
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One dilemma when enemy forces are the object of
control in sanctuaries is that friendly forces are eliminating a source of income for both sanctuary landlords
and owners—alienating both groups. Worse, landlords
and owners suffer from the consequences of combat
through the destruction of property and lives, further
angering those groups against friendly activities. Sanctuary-seekers cannot be destroyed completely because
they are dispersed and, therefore, will continue terrorist activities even if the high-value targets or percentage of terrorists are eliminated: one cannot “kill
their way to victory.” Externally supported groups
make destruction of terrorists even more difficult: new
sanctuary tenants (i.e., terrorists) can be found and
replace those destroyed. Conversely, using rent as an
object of sanctuary control means that friendly forces
have increased incomes for landlords, and potentially
owners, by increasing the rent. The sanctuary-seeker
must either respond to this new price or move out of
the market and seek sanctuary elsewhere. If the tenant
reacts violently to the increased rent, it may either cause
additional frictions with the landlords and owners or
may provide opportunities for the tenant to be more
easily captured or killed—it would be easier to identify and isolate the enemy at this point due to increased
alienation from the local population.
The final consideration to control sanctuary is the
duration of control. Raising the rent can begin once the
determination is made to assert control over enemy
groups and adequate funding is allocated—which
should be substantially less than offensive military
operations. This allows the duration to be affected over
a longer period of time, as well as makes the scheme
of control flexible to adapt to enemy changes. The
duration of control will be until the desired effects of
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degrade, bankrupt, transform, integrate, or displace
have been achieved.
Denial of Sanctuary: Means for Controlling Saharan
Sanctuary and the U.S. Army
The U.S. Army has significant roles at the tactical
and operational levels of war for controlling terrorist
sanctuary areas. Key considerations for Army commanders and staffs when seeking to control sanctuary in the Sahara include: the value and use of
intelligence, decentralization of command and control,
operational integration, mobility, and emphasis upon
whole-of-government activities.134
Military Intelligence
Knowledge about the enemy remains paramount
in counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and sanctuary control operations. Intelligence capabilities are as
important as intelligence dissemination—getting the
information to the people who can act upon it quickly.
Commanders must ensure that critical information can
flow quickly up and down the chain of command. Critical information in the Sahara includes the locations of
wells and cache sites, because controlling these locations will deny enemy resupply. Another example of
critical information includes the acquisition and movement of new Toyota trucks that could be observed to
provide information about who needs and can afford
new vehicles. It will also be necessary for U.S. forces
to collaborate with local security forces and employ
“Kit Carson Scouts” to assist in identifying and locating individuals.135 Additionally, critical vulnerabilities,
such as personnel required for navigating and crossing these remote and difficult areas, including the best
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and most experienced drivers, should be identified,
and targeted. Other vulnerabilities such as communication networks, including internet activities, could be
monitored or attacked. Finally, local communities and
the sanctuary owners must be identified and protected
from sanctuary-seeking groups.
Decentralization of Command and Control
Raising the rent to control sanctuary primarily
requires influencing local actors to demand more from
terrorists like Belmokhtar for sanctuary space. The
ability to operate independently and communicate
directly with various groups and cultures are critical
skills in denying sanctuary. The milieu for such operations is diverse and complex; controlling sanctuary
will result from team efforts uniting a range of individuals and organizations under the common goal of
denying access to sanctuary areas and displacing sanctuary-seekers. Dispersion in this terrain is important,
and units will need to move in small teams instead
of large formations. Due to the speed that small units
can move in open desert terrain, air power is valuable
because it can move rapidly and employ precision firepower, as well as collect information.136 Unity of effort
is more important than unity of command, and effects
will be achieved at lower levels of command, in turn
requiring the knowledge, skills, and empowerment
of subordinate leaders.137 Decisive battle will remain
elusive, if not impossible,138 and the lessons of the
U.S. Army campaign against Geronimo apply today;
the fight to control sanctuary will involve difficult,
time-consuming pursuit, and it will ultimately be won
by sergeants and lieutenants.
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Operational Integration
Combined and Joint operations are needed to
combat the financing of sanctuary but are not the hallmarks of Army units. Integration across the warfighting functions, specifically intelligence and aviation,
as well as other types of organizations such as special
operations will be essential; and integration was specifically cited by the French as being critical to their
successful operations in Northern Mali.139 Direct contact between aviation elements and ground elements,
whether for close air support or intelligence purposes,
is vital, and the integration of airpower with elements
on the ground, particularly with partner nation forces,
will be necessary. Thus, incorporating partner nation
elements also will characterize sanctuary control operations and require superior communication and leadership, particularly at the lowest levels of command.140
Mobility
Combat in this environment is characterized by
speed and mobility. Soldiers will need to adapt to
the environment and use non-tactical equipment or
off-the-shelf technology, which is better suited and
easier to maintain in such environments. Belmokhtar
retained operational flexibility because AQIM carried a
minimum amount of ammunition, enough to conduct
a hasty ambush or fight a meeting engagement and
then disengage.141 Instead of overwhelming firepower,
AQIM used relative superiority, or surprise with limited but concentrated firepower, to achieve success.142
Belmokhtar’s decentralized logistics system enabled
his mobility and relative superiority but relied upon
dispersed cache locations and a network of informants
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and facilitators. These sanctuary-seeker characteristics, combined with difficult terrain and lack of infrastructure, make unit-level resupply difficult and could
require units to live off the land. Such operations will
demand unpredictability, tactical flexibility, and iron
but imaginative and adaptable leadership.143
Whole-of-Government Activities
Raising sanctuary rents could be performed by partners who pursue terrorist elements, as well as exploiting vulnerabilities like racism in AQIM.144 The terrorist
groups are not representative of the cultures or values
in their sanctuary areas: AQIM’s brand of religion and
governance are incompatible with the local population.
Army elements, like civil affairs, could provide essential services or bring critical assistance to marginalized
groups. Units could partner with host nation forces to
improve their capabilities, as well as leverage cultural
advisors in the form of anthropologists to determine
the relationships between sanctuary landlords, owners,
and tenants to create frictions or leverage. Harmonization of civil and military activities is the essence of successful sanctuary control efforts because such efforts
seek to find and exploit weaknesses in the relationship
among the sanctuary-seeker, the sanctuary-payer, the
sanctuary-owner, and the rent-seeker.
CONCLUSION
Belmokhtar’s Saharan sanctuary was realized
through a complex system of transactional relationships
paid through rents. Altering this system by increasing the cost of sanctuary and disrupting the alliances
between sanctuary-owners and sanctuary-seekers
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will disrupt terrorist operations and neutralize their
effectiveness.
French efforts to deny terrorist sanctuary in Northern Mali, like U.S. operations elsewhere, focused upon
the destruction of enemy forces, not the control of
sanctuary areas. While destroying significant numbers
of fighters and equipment, these operations ultimately
have had limited effects upon terrorist organizations
and the wider popular movements they exploited.
Some estimates conclude the French military destroyed
less than 20 percent of AQIM fighters in the region, and
most survivors have simply moved to other terrorist
sanctuary areas in southern Libya or Northern Niger.
Thus, seeking to control or deny the functions of sanctuary through the destruction of enemy forces is likely
to have immediate and local effects on enemy personnel, but unlikely to eliminate those groups or have
long-term positive effects on regional security. Several
years after major French combat operations ended in
Northern Mali, terrorist attacks in Mali continued, and
“Malian patience with the negotiation process is running thin. Some are losing hope that the government
will be able to achieve a lasting peace.”145 Furthermore,
the French and American ways to deny sanctuary in
Northern Mali have been and continue to be costly.
France still has troops in Mali and recently announced
a significant investment of $50 million of security assistance146 for regional partners, while the United States
continues to increase its regional posture147 and build
partner nation capacity programs—although the longterm impacts of military capacity-building remain in
dispute and controversial.148 More worrisome is that
terrorist attacks in domestic France have increased. In
spite of the destruction of terrorists and their equipment, continued international security investment,

56

and increased military footprints, violent extremists
seem more capable than ever of projecting terror from
sanctuary areas in Northwest Africa.
Denying terrorists sanctuary is not about killing
terrorists in sanctuaries, but about controlling sanctuary space to control the terrorists further and deny
them the protection they require. Controlling terrorist sanctuary, therefore, does not require direct military intervention, offensive military operations, or
nation-building, but seeks instead to prevent terrorists from using their sanctuary to perform the key
functions which sanctuary serves. Instead of denying
sanctuary everywhere, as the ink-spot methodology
presupposes, sanctuary could be controlled indirectly
by raising the rent on terrorists and forcing them out of
business or moving them to lower rent areas that offer
fewer possibilities to conduct training, planning, and
operations.
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